3.1.2003.3.2006.March 2003 Top Secret Memo. TRANSFER OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION POTENTIAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS Translation.1616468


Several other translations reveal that the Iraqis referred to their chemical weapons as "special ammunition".

Here we have, the day before the invasion, a top secret memo with instructions on where to transfer some "special ammunition" from Najaf to ammunition depots near Baghdad. The transfer to Baghdad would be logistically opportune if there was intent to use these "special weapons" against advancing Coalition forces.

Here's another interesting item.

The Iraqi army did not use its "special ammunition distribution" system before the war. A former senior Iraqi artillery officer says the system broke down and even if it had not, the Iraqi army would not have used it.

This is very likely as it's now known that the Iraqi army, a bunch of conscripted fellows at any rate, didn't put up any fight during the American invasion.

So, did Saddam THINK he had "special ammunition" that he was moving all around on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom in hopes of using it? Was Saddam deceived about the existence and/or the quantities of chemical weapons on hand by his rather disloyal military?

The 2nd RG Corps had chemical defense battalions, according to the former Al Quds Forces Chief-of-Staff, but these battalions left their equipment in their barracks during Operation Iraqi Freedom because the corps commander was confident the Coalition would not use CBW against Iraq. They probably would have retained this equipment had the commanders envisioned using CBW munitions in the 2nd RG Corps.

The RG did not use its special ammunition distribution system before either the Gulf war or Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to a former senior Iraqi artillery officer. This system-specialized chemical battalions; replacement of company drivers with chemical battalion drivers and ammunition handlers; and use of special MIC depots-had served it well during the Iran-Iraq war. The source commented that all systems broke down and there was no chemical ammunition distribution system during OIF. Even if units had received chemical ammunition, they would have buried it, not fired it.

Translation 1616468
Harmony Document PDF file for Translation 1616468

Document ISGP-2003-0001498 ISGP-2003-0001498 contains a 9 pages TOP SECRET memo (pages 87-96 in the pdf document) dated March 16 2003 that talks about transferring "SPECIAL AMMUNITION" from one ammunition depot in Najaf to other ammunition depots near Baghdad. As we know by now the term SPECIAL AMMUNITION was used by Saddam Regime to designate CHEMICAL WEAPONS as another translated document has already shown. For example in document CMPC 2004-002219 where Saddam regime decided to use "CHEMICAL WEAPONS against the Kurds" they used the term "SPECIAL AMMUNITION" for chemical weapon What is also interesting is that these "SPECIAL AMMUNITION" were listed as 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shells which are not by itself SPECIAL unless it contain CHEMICAL WEAPONS. In fact the Iraqi have always used 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shell as a main delivery tool for Chemical Weapons Agents by filling these type of shells with Nerve Gas, Sarin, Racin, Mustard gas and other Chemical Agents.

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